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2. Exogeneity: E[ε∗|X∗] = 0
3. Variability in treatment: 0 < Var (X∗), and, E
[
(X∗)4
]
<∞
4. Variability in residuals: Var [ε∗|X∗] = σ2ε∗, and, E
[
(ε∗)4 |X∗] <∞
5. Independent sampling of individuals: (Y ∗t , X
∗
t , ε
∗
t ) ⊥ (Y ∗s , X∗s , ε∗s) ∀t 6= s.
Assumption 2 (Replicated Classical Measurement Error). We observe multiple replicates
for noisy measurements of Y ∗ and X∗ that are tainted by classical measurement error.
1. Xk = X∗ + νkX , k = 1, . . . KX
(a) E
[
νkX |X∗, Y ∗
]
= 0
(b) E
[
(νkX)
2|X∗, Y ∗] = σ2
νkX
(c) E
[
(νkX)
4|X∗, Y ∗] <∞
(d) νkX ⊥ νlX , ∀k 6= l
2. Y k = Y ∗ + νkY k = 1, . . . KY
(a) E
[
νkY |X∗, Y ∗
]
= 0
(b) E
[
(νkY )
2|X∗, Y ∗] = σ2
νkY
(c) E
[
(νkY )
4|X∗, Y ∗] <∞
(d) νkY ⊥ νlY , ∀k 6= l
3. Independence across measures: νkY ⊥ νlX , ∀k, l
4. Independent sampling of individuals: ∀s, t ∈ {1, . . . , N} , s.t. t 6= s:
νkX,t ⊥ νlX,s, ∀k, l ∈ {1, . . . , KX} , and, νkY,t ⊥ νlY,s, ∀k, l ∈ {1, . . . , KY }
Our objective is to perform consistent and (potentially) efficient inference on β, for which
we propose the ORIV regression.1 Defining 1N as a (N × 1) vector of 1’s and 0N as a (N × 1)
1The conditional independence restrictions imposed in Assumptions 1 and 2 are stronger than necessary
for our purposes and can be weakened to mean independence conditions using standard arguments. We
make these assumptions for ease of interpretation. In principle, the conditional independence assumption
provides meaningful additional restrictions that could enhance the identification power, estimator efficiency,
and testable restrictions of the model. This is an interesting direction for future research.
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vector of 0’s, the independent and dependent variables are:
Y˜ ≡ [Y 1′, . . . , Y KY ′]′ X˜k ≡ 1KY ⊗Xk
YOR ≡ 1KX ⊗ Y XOR ≡
[
X˜1′, . . . , X˜KX ′
]′
Now construct the instruments for each model:
W k ≡ [X1, . . . , Xk−1, 0N , Xk+1, . . . , XKX]
W˜ k ≡ 1KY ⊗W k
WOR ≡

W˜ 1 0 · · · 0
0 W˜ 2
. . . 0
0 · · · . . . ...
0 · · · 0 W˜KX

Then, as we soon show, the ORIV estimator fits the linear model with the exogeneity re-
striction:
YOR = XORβ
∗ + εOR, E[εOR|WOR] = 0.
Letting PWOR ≡ WOR (W ′ORWOR)−1W ′OR denote the projection matrix onto the column space
of WOR, we can write the ORIV estimator for β using the usual formula:
βˆ∗ = (X ′ORPWORXOR)
−1
X ′ORPWORYOR. (A.1)
A.2 ORIV Estimator Consistency
We now present the standard arguments for IV estimator consistency in the ORIV setting,
establishing the result stated in the text’s Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. ORIV produces consistent estimates of β∗.
Proof. We begin by verifying the exogeneity condition E[εOR,n|WOR,n] = 0. This requires
breaking εOR down equation-by-equation to verify the condition for each IV specification
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included in the model.
εi,j = Y i −Xjβ∗
= Y ∗ + νiY −X∗β∗ − νjXβ∗
= X∗β∗ + ε∗ + νiY −X∗β∗ − νjXβ∗
= ε∗ + νiY − νjXβ∗.
Note the ORIV estimator interacts ε(i,j) solely with W (j), so that:
E
[
εi,j|W j] = E[ε∗ + νiY − νjXβ∗|W j]
=
E
[
ε∗|W j]+E[νiY |W j]+E[νjX |W j]βOR
= 0.
The first term above cancels by the exogeneity condition in assumption 1.2, the second by the
classical measurement error assumption 2.3, and the last by assumptions 2.1(a) and 2.1(d)
because the kth column of W k is zeroed out.
We now recall the formula for βˆ∗ from equation A.1:
βˆ∗ = (X ′ORPWORXOR)
−1
X ′ORPWORYOR
= (X ′ORPWORXOR)
−1
X ′ORPWORXORβ
∗ + (X ′ORPWORXOR)
−1
X ′ORPWORεOR
= β∗ + (X ′ORPWORXOR)
−1
X ′ORPWORεOR.
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To establish consistency of the estimator, notice that:
βˆ∗ − β∗ = (X ′ORPWORXOR)−1X ′ORPWORεOR
=
(
1
N
X ′ORWOR
(
1
N
W ′ORWOR
)−1
1
N
W ′ORXOR
)−1
∗ 1
N
X ′ORWOR
(
1
N
W ′ORWOR
)−1
1
N
W ′ORεOR.
The bounded fourth moments in assumptions 1.4, 2.1(c), and 2.2(c) allow us to apply a
strong law of large numbers for each of the averages in the above formula. Further, since
E[εOR,n|WOR,n] = 0 ⇒ E[WOR,nεOR,n] = 0, the last term 1NW ′ORεOR →p 0, yielding our
desired consistency result:
(
βˆ∗ − β∗
)
→p 0.
A.3 Asymptotic Normality and Clustered Variances
We now establish asymptotic normality and present a consistent estimator for the variance
of βˆ∗. This establishes the proof for Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. The ORIV estimator satisfies asymptotic normality under Assumptions (1)
and (2). The estimated standard errors, when clustered by participant, are consistent for the
asymptotic standard errors.
Proof. We first establish asymptotic normality. Let ΣεOR ≡ E [εORε′OR]. By laws of large
numbers,
SX′W ≡ plim
n→∞
1
N
X ′ORWOR , SW ′W ≡ plim
n→∞
1
N
W ′ORWOR , and ΩOR ≡ plim
n→∞
1
N
W ′ORΣεORWOR.
From the Central Limit Theorem, N−1/2W ′ORεOR →d N (0,ΩOR).
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Asymptotic normality of βˆOR now follows since:
√
N
(
βˆ∗ − β∗
)
=
(
1
N
X ′ORWOR
(
1
N
W ′ORWOR
)−1
1
N
W ′ORXOR
)−1
∗ 1
N
X ′ORWOR
(
1
N
W ′ORWOR
)−1
N−1/2W ′ORεOR
→p N
(
0,Σβˆ∗
)
, where
Σβˆ∗ =
(
SX′WS
−1
W ′WS
′
X′W
)−1
SX′WS
−1
W ′WΩS
−1
W ′WS
′
X′W
(
SX′WS
−1
W ′WS
′
X′W
)−1
.
A feasible estimator of the asymptotic variance requires an estimate for Ω, which we will
show is available using the usual clustered variance-covariance matrix estimator. To achieve
this result, we characterize the structure of ΣεOR . Consider
E
[
εi,js ε
k,l
t
]
= E
[(
ε∗s + ν
i
Y,s − νjX,sβ∗
) (
ε∗t + ν
k
Y,t − νlX,tβ∗
)]
= E
[
ε∗sε
∗
t +
ε∗sν
k
Y,t −ε∗sνlX,tβ∗
+
νiY,sε
∗
t + ν
i
Y,sν
k
Y,t −

νiY,sν
l
X,tβ
∗
−ν
j
X,sε
∗
t −

νjX,sν
k
Y,t + ν
j
X,sν
l
X,t(β
∗)2
]
= E
[
ε∗sε
∗
t + ν
i
Y,sν
k
Y,t + ν
j
X,sν
l
X,t(β
∗)2
]
.
Therefore, we have:
E
[
εi,js ε
k,l
t
]
=

0, if s 6= t,∀i, j, k, l
s00 ≡ σ2ε∗ , if s = t, i 6= k, j 6= l
si0 ≡ σ2ε∗ + σ2νiY i, if s = t, i = k, j 6= l
s0j ≡ σ2ε∗ + σ2νjX (β
∗)2, if s = t, i 6= k, j = l
sij ≡ σ2ε∗ + σ2νiY + σ
2
νjX
(β∗)2, if s = t, i = k, j = l
. (A.2)
This formula allows us to populate the entries of ΣεOR . Denote by SY the diagonal
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matrix with entries
[
σ2
ν1Y
, . . . , σ2
ν
KY
Y
]
and, similarly, by SX the diagonal matrix with entries[
σ2
ν1X
, . . . , σ2
ν
KX
X
]
. Letting IN denote the N ×N Identity matrix and working with Kronecker
products, we can write:
ΣεOR =σ
2
ε∗
[(
1(KXKY )1
′
(KXKY )
)⊗ IN] (A.3)
+
[
SY ⊗
((
1KX1
′
KX
)⊗ IN)]
+ β∗2
[((
1KY 1
′
KY
)⊗ SX)⊗ IN] .
Importantly, the result indicates that all of the non-zero entries in ΣεOR correspond to in-
stances where the individual representing the unit of observation is the same in two different
regression matrices.
Define εˆOR,(i) ≡ YOR,i − XOR,iβˆ∗ and consider the estimator for ΣˆεOR that sets its (i, j)
entry equal to εˆOR,(i)εˆOR,(i) if the (i, j) entry in ΣεOR is non-zero. Then, by the Law of Large
Numbers:
Ωˆ ≡ 1
N
W ′ORΣˆεORWOR →p Ω
NΣˆβˆ∗ ≡ N
X ′ORWOR (W
′
ORWOR)
−1 Ωˆ (W ′ORWOR)
−1 W ′ORXOR
(X ′ORPWORXOR)
2 →p ΣβˆOR .
A.4 Inference on Correlation Coefficients
A.4.1 Consistency and Asymptotic Normality
We now establish consistency and asymptotic normality of the correlation estimator as stated
in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. ρˆ∗XY is consistent with an asymptotically normal distribution, where stan-
dard errors can be derived using the delta method. These standard errors can be consistently
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estimated using a bootstrap to construct confidence intervals.
Proof. Consistency follows from a straightforward application of the Continuous Mapping
Theorem. In particular, note that:
Ĉov[Xa, Xb]→p Cov[Xa, Xb] = σ2X∗
Ĉov[Y a, Y b]→p Cov[Y a, Y b] = σ2Y ∗
⇒
√√√√Ĉov[Xa, Xb]
Ĉov[Y a, Y b]
→p
√
Cov[Xa, Xb]
Cov[Y a, Y b]
=
σX∗
σY ∗
.
Given that βˆ∗ is consistent for β∗ = Cov(X
∗,Y ∗)
σ2
X∗
, we have:
ρˆ∗XY =
√√√√Ĉov[Xa, Xb]
Ĉov[Y a, Y b]
βˆ∗ →p Cov (X
∗, Y ∗)
σX∗σY ∗
= ρ∗XY .
For the limiting distribution, assume independent sampling and suppose all observed ran-
dom variables have bounded 8th moments (so their kurtosis can be consistently estimated).
Then βˆ∗, Ĉov[Xa, Xb], and Ĉov[Y a, Y b] are jointly asymptotically normal:
√
n

βˆ∗ − β∗
Ĉov[Xa, Xb]− σ2X∗
Ĉov[Y a, Y b]− σ2Y ∗
→d N (0,Ψ) ,
where:
Ψ =

σ2
βˆ∗
σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Xa,Xb] σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Y a,Y b]
σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Xa,Xb] σ
2
Ĉov[Xa,Xb]
σĈov[Xa,Xb],Ĉov[Y a,Y b]
σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Y a,Y b] σĈov[Xa,Xb],Ĉov[Y a,Y b] σ
2
Ĉov[Y a,Y b]

reflects the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimators βˆ∗, Ĉov[Xa, Xb], and Ĉov[Y a, Y b].
Denoting the kurtosis ofX∗ and Y ∗ as ζX = E
[
(X∗ − E [X∗])4] and ζY = E [(Y ∗ − E [Y ∗])4],
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respectively, algebraic manipulation yields:
σ2
βˆ∗ = ΣβˆOR (A.4)
σ2
Ĉov[Xa,Xb]
= ζX − σ4X∗ + σ2X∗
(
σ2ν1X
+ σ2ν2X
)
+ σ2ν1X
σ2ν2X
σ2
Ĉov[Y a,Y b]
= ζY − σ4Y ∗ + σ2Y ∗
(
σ2ν1Y
+ σ2ν2Y
)
+ σ2ν1Y
σ2ν2Y
σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Xa,Xb] = β
X ′1X1σ
2
ν1X
+X ′2X2σ
2
ν2X
X ′1X1 +X
′
2X2
σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Y a,Y b] = β
σ2
ν1Y
+ σ2
ν2Y
2
σĈov[Xa,Xb],Ĉov[Y a,Y b] = β
2ζX
The delta method approximation builds on a Taylor expansion of ρˆ∗XY at (β
∗, σ2X∗ , σ
2
Y ∗):
ρˆ∗XY =
√√√√Ĉov[Xa, Xb]
Ĉov[Y a, Y b]
βˆ∗ ≈
√
σ2X∗
σ2Y ∗
β∗ +
√
σ2X∗
σ2Y ∗
(
βˆ∗ − β∗
)
+
β∗
2
√
σ2X∗σ
2
Y ∗
(
Ĉov[Xa, Xb]− σ2X∗
)
− β
∗
2
√
σ2X∗
σ6Y ∗
(
Ĉov[Y a, Y b]− σ2Y ∗
)
.
Since the remainder in the approximation is op (n), asymptotic normality for ρˆ
∗
XY follows:
√
n (ρˆ∗XY − ρ∗XY ) =a
√
σ2X∗
σ2Y ∗
√
n
(
βˆ∗ − β∗
)
+
β∗
2
√
σ2X∗σ
2
Y ∗
√
n
(
Ĉov[Xa, Xb]− σ2X∗
)
− β
∗
2
√
σ2X∗
σ6Y ∗
√
n
(
Ĉov[Y a, Y b]− σ2Y ∗
)
→dN
(
0, V ∞ρˆ∗XY
)
.
To derive the asymptotic variance, we square the right-hand side of this expression and
solve for its limiting expectation. Using the expressions from (A.4), we can derive the
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asymptotic variance as:
V ∞ρˆ∗XY =
σ2X∗
σ2Y ∗
σ2
βˆ∗ +
β∗2
4σ2X∗σ
2
Y ∗
σ2
Ĉov[Xa,Xb]
+
β∗2
4
σ2X∗
σ6Y ∗
σ2
Ĉov[Y a,Y b]
(A.5)
+
β∗
σ2Y ∗
σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Xa,Xb] − β∗
σ2X∗
σ4Y ∗
σβˆ∗,Ĉov[Y a,Y b] −
β∗2
2σ4Y ∗
σĈov[Xa,Xb],Ĉov[Y a,Y b].
Since all the variance and covariance terms on the right hand side of (A.5) are finite,
so long as the variances σ2X∗ and σ
2
Y ∗ are bounded away from zero, this asymptotic vari-
ance is also finite. With asymptotic normality, we can construct confidence intervals using
asymptotically pivotal t-statistics centered on the null-hypothesis that ρ∗XY = ρˆ
∗
XY for all
|ρˆ∗XY | < 1. With this specification, the bootstrap’s empirical distribution function converges
to the population distribution function. In particular, standard errors can be consistently
estimated using a bootstrap to construct confidence intervals.
A.4.2 Bootstrapping Correlation Standard Errors for Confidence Regions
Given the complex formula in (A.5) and the difficulty of computing fourth moments using
standard statistical tools, we propose using a bootstrap to compute standard errors for con-
structing confidence intervals. Proposition 3 above assures that estimated standard errors
using a bootstrap are consistent. Incorporating the sampling error from Ĉov[Xa, Xb] and
Ĉov[Y a, Y b] requires only a small modification to the standard bootstrap procedure, as pre-
sented for the case with two replicates of X and Y in Algorithm 1 below. We present the
rescaling approach to computing the ORIV correlation in step 3 as it may facilitate bootstrap
implementation in some statistical packages. STATA code implementing the bootstrapped
standard errors is shown in Appendix C. A STATA package for computing ORIV correlations
and bootstrapped standard errors is available from the authors upon request.
Online Appendix–10
Supplemental Material for: Leeat Yariv, Ben Gillen, Erik Snowberg. 2019. "Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with 
Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study." Journal of Political Economy 127(4). DOI: 10.1086/701681. 
Algorithm 1 Bootstrap Algorithm for ORIV Correlation Standard Errors
For m = 1, . . . ,M :
1. Randomly draw an index of n observations from {1, . . . , n} with replacement. Denote this index:
T (m) =
{
t
(m)
1 , t
(m)
2 , . . . , t
(m)
n
}
.
2. Construct Xa,(m), Xb,(m), Y a,(m), and Y b,(m) so that:
Xa,(m) =
[
Xa
t
(m)
1
, Xa
t
(m)
2
, . . . , Xa
t
(m)
n
]
, Xb,(m) =
[
Xb
t
(m)
1
, Xb
t
(m)
2
, . . . , Xb
t
(m)
n
]
Y a,(m) =
[
Y a
t
(m)
1
, Y a
t
(m)
2
, . . . , Y a
t
(m)
n
]
, Y b,(m) =
[
Y b
t
(m)
1
, Y b
t
(m)
2
, . . . , Y b
t
(m)
n
]
.
3. Compute ORIV Correlations ρˆ
(m)
XY from X
a,(m), Xb,(m), Y a,(m), and Y b,(m):
3.A. Calculate the bootstrapped attenuation factors
X¯a,(m) ≡ 1
n
n∑
τ=1
Xa
t
(m)
τ
, X¯b,(m) ≡ 1
n
n∑
τ=1
Xb
t
(m)
τ
, Y¯ a,(m) ≡ 1
n
n∑
τ=1
Y a
t
(m)
τ
, Y¯ b,(m) ≡ 1
n
n∑
τ=1
Y b
t
(m)
τ
σˆ2X∗,(m) =
1
n
n∑
τ=1
(
Xa
t
(m)
τ
− X¯a,(m)
)(
Xb
t
(m)
τ
− X¯b,(m)
)
,
σˆ2Y ∗,(m) =
1
n
n∑
τ=1
(
Y a
t
(m)
τ
− Y¯ a,(m)
)(
Y b
t
(m)
τ
− Y¯ b,(m)
)
.
3.B. Rescale the resampled data to define X˜a,(m), X˜b,(m), Y˜ a,(m), and Y˜ b,(m).
X˜a,(m) ≡ X
a,(m)√
σˆ2X∗,(m)
, X˜b,(m) ≡ X
b,(m)√
σˆ2X∗,(m)
, Y˜ a,(m) ≡ Y
a,(m)√
σˆ2Y ∗,(m)
, Y˜ b,(m) ≡ Y
n,(m)√
σˆ2Y ∗,(m)
3.C. Compute and store ρˆ
(m)
XY from the ORIV Regression of Y˜
(m) on X˜(m).
The bootstrap variance estimator is:
VˆBS (ρˆXY ) ≡ 1
M
M∑
m=1
(
ρˆ
(m)
XY − ρˆXY
)2
A.4.3 Finite-Sample Hypothesis Tests and Confidence Interval Coverage
We performed a series of simulations to ensure hypothesis tests and confidence intervals
using asymptotic and bootstrapped standard errors have appropriate size and coverage in
finite samples. The simulations specify a data generating process sampling independently in
t:  X∗t
Y ∗t
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
 1 ρ
ρ 1

 .
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We generated two contaminated measures of both X∗t and Y
∗
t with independent normally
distributed measurement error, defining
Xat = X
∗
t + η
X,a
t X
b
t = X
∗
t + η
X,b
t Y
a
t = Y
∗
t + η
Y,a
t Y
b
t = Y
∗
t + η
Y,b
t ,
where each η·t ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
is drawn independently of all other measurement errors.
Different simulations are used to generate data sets of size n ∈ {100, 250, 500, 1000}.
We estimate models with correlations ρ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.95, 0.99} and measurement error
variances σ2η ∈ {0, 0.1/0.9, 0.25/0.75, 0.5/0.5}. Hypothesis tests and confidence intervals are
constructed using t-Statistics at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, where standard errors are
calculated using the asymptotic approximation in (A.5) and the bootstrap algorithm with
10,000 replications.
Table A.1 presents the finite-sample estimated standard errors from 1,000 simulations.
Across all specifications, the estimated standard errors display only moderate bias. The only
notable bias appears in extreme cases featuring small samples, where measurement error
variability and the underlying correlation are both high. In such settings, the bootstrap
procedure occasionally generates samples in which the estimated variance σˆ2Y ∗ is nearly zero.
The explosive impact of these draws on the estimated correlations leads to bootstrapped
standard errors that greatly exceed the population standard errors. Outside of these extreme
cases, the bootstrap demonstrates negligible bias in estimated standard errors. In fact, for
reasonable levels of measurement errors, of the order we observe in our data, we see very
little bias.
To evaluate the finite-sample performance of hypothesis tests, table A.2 reports rejection
frequencies using t-Tests. As with the standard errors, when measurement error constitutes
less than 50% of the variance in the underlying variables or correlations are lower than
0.95, inference using bootstrapped or asymptotic standard errors appears reasonable for any
sample size. We expect these to be the ranges that are relevant for most experimental work.
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Table A.1: Simulated Bias in Estimated Standard Errors for Correlations
Panel A: Bootstrap Standard Error Bias (*1,000) Panel B: Asymptotic Standard Error Bias (*1,000)
n = 100 σ2η n = 100 σ
2
η
ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5 ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5
0 -5.18 -2.82 -6.30 15.47 0 -5.50 -3.07 -6.85 -6.53
0.25 -0.52 -0.55 0.21 3.99 0.25 -1.37 -1.38 -0.52 -7.14
0.5 -1.24 0.26 -3.79 29.09 0.5 -3.79 -2.15 -5.92 -2.65
0.95 0.47 0.28 0.25 63.98 0.95 -4.70 -3.15 -5.75 -4.32
0.99 0.50 1.00 0.45 71.29 0.99 4.07 7.02 0.96 -6.09
n = 250 σ2η n = 250 σ
2
η
ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5 ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5
0 -0.61 -1.72 -0.87 -3.04 0 -0.64 -1.70 -0.91 -3.67
0.25 -1.66 -1.23 -2.24 -1.47 0.25 -1.85 -1.42 -2.43 -2.22
0.5 -0.73 -0.42 -0.22 -3.06 0.5 -1.36 -1.01 -0.69 -4.19
0.95 0.19 -0.03 -0.27 3.71 0.95 -2.02 -2.16 -2.40 1.64
0.99 0.16 0.04 0.29 0.98 0.99 2.43 2.99 -0.87 -1.16
n = 500 σ2η n = 500 σ
2
η
ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5 ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5
0 0.72 0.92 -0.11 4.41 0 0.71 0.92 -0.09 4.23
0.25 -0.32 0.11 0.12 -0.68 250 -0.36 0.10 0.04 -0.91
0.5 0.26 0.47 0.92 1.24 500 0.12 0.30 0.75 1.17
0.95 -0.17 -0.12 -0.82 0.79 950 -1.83 -1.72 -2.51 0.43
0.99 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.36 990 1.46 1.77 -0.81 -0.17
n = 1, 000 σ2η n = 1, 000 σ
2
η
ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5 ρ 0 0.1/0.9 0.25/0.75 0.5/0.5
0 0.76 0.56 0.35 0.23 0 0.75 0.56 0.34 0.17
0.25 0.00 -0.18 -0.04 0.27 0.25 -0.03 -0.21 -0.07 0.20
0.5 0.06 0.12 0.29 0.80 0.5 0.01 0.05 0.31 0.82
0.95 -0.07 -0.22 -0.72 0.98 0.95 -0.66 -0.71 -1.12 1.18
0.99 0.03 0.04 -0.24 0.02 0.99 0.79 0.62 -1.29 -0.16
This table reports simulated finite-sample bias in estimated standard errors relative to simulated standard
errors for the ORIV correlations in 1,000 simulations with normally distributed variables for a range of
sample sizes (n), true correlations (ρ), and variability of measurement error (σ2η). Bootstrap standard errors
(Panel A) are calculated using the bootstrap algorithm presented in section A.4.2 with 10,000 resampling
draws. Asymptotic standard errors (Panel B) are calculated using the formula in (A.5).
For completeness, we explore more extreme cases to identify where the asymptotic ap-
proximations may not be valid. When n = 100, hypothesis tests typically reject the null
hypothesis more often than expected based on the nominal size though the distortion is not
extreme. If the true correlation is as high as 0.99 or the variance of measurement error
matches or exceeds that of the underlying X∗ and Y ∗, the asymptotic approximation breaks
down in samples with fewer than 1,000 observations. The bootstrap overstates the variance
of the estimator in these settings, which results in overly conservative tests that fail to reject
the null hypothesis with sufficient frequency.
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Table A.2: Simulated Rejection Frequencies for Bootstrapped Correlation t-Tests
Panel A: 1% Level Panel B: 5% Level Panel C: 10% Level
n = 100 σ2η σ
2
η σ
2
η
ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50%
0 2.2% 1.8% 2.1% 1.5% 0 6.5% 5.2% 7.2% 5.9% 0 12.0% 10.7% 12.5% 10.5%
0.25 1.4% 1.6% 2.0% 1.4% 0.25 6.2% 6.2% 5.9% 5.9% 0.25 11.1% 11.3% 9.9% 11.1%
0.5 1.6% 1.9% 1.4% 1.1% 0.5 5.5% 5.5% 6.1% 5.1% 0.5 10.3% 11.2% 12.3% 9.1%
0.95 1.3% 1.5% 1.3% 0.3% 0.95 4.5% 5.1% 5.5% 2.1% 0.95 9.4% 9.9% 10.1% 4.9%
0.99 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.99 1.8% 2.7% 3.6% 2.0% 0.99 4.7% 6.3% 7.8% 5.3%
n = 250 σ2η σ
2
η σ
2
η
ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50%
0 1.2% 1.3% 0.9% 1.3% 0 4.9% 5.9% 5.3% 6.1% 0 10.9% 11.7% 10.7% 11.5%
0.25 1.4% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 0.25 5.6% 5.5% 6.1% 6.0% 0.25 10.4% 10.9% 11.5% 10.7%
0.5 1.5% 1.5% 2.0% 1.7% 0.5 5.2% 5.4% 5.4% 6.0% 0.5 10.6% 10.3% 9.8% 11.4%
0.95 1.4% 2.2% 1.4% 0.5% 0.95 5.0% 5.6% 4.6% 3.0% 0.95 9.2% 10.6% 10.1% 8.3%
0.99 0.7% 0.9% 0.5% 0.5% 0.99 3.6% 4.4% 5.1% 3.0% 0.99 7.1% 10.6% 9.7% 8.6%
n = 500 σ2η σ
2
η σ
2
η
ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50%
0 0.6% 1.2% 1.2% 0.6% 0 4.8% 5.4% 5.2% 3.8% 0 10.2% 9.3% 10.0% 9.3%
0.25 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 0.9% 0.25 6.1% 5.3% 4.8% 5.8% 0.25 10.1% 10.5% 10.4% 12.2%
0.5 1.2% 1.4% 1.0% 1.0% 0.5 4.7% 4.5% 4.3% 4.2% 0.5 10.3% 9.7% 9.4% 8.9%
0.95 0.8% 0.8% 1.3% 1.1% 0.95 5.2% 5.4% 6.9% 4.6% 0.95 11.8% 10.4% 12.3% 9.1%
0.99 0.9% 0.4% 0.9% 0.6% 0.99 4.3% 4.6% 4.5% 4.7% 0.99 8.2% 10.1% 9.7% 9.8%
n = 1, 000 σ2η σ
2
η σ
2
η
ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50% ρ 0 10% 25% 50%
0 1.4% 0.6% 1.5% 1.3% 0 4.5% 5.1% 4.7% 5.2% 0 9.0% 10.1% 9.8% 9.5%
0.25 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 1.1% 0.25 4.9% 4.7% 5.5% 4.8% 0.25 11.3% 11.3% 10.1% 11.2%
0.5 1.6% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 0.5 4.9% 5.0% 4.6% 4.2% 0.5 9.1% 10.4% 9.4% 9.5%
0.95 1.3% 1.4% 1.2% 0.8% 0.95 5.0% 5.4% 6.3% 4.3% 0.95 9.7% 9.9% 11.1% 9.4%
0.99 0.9% 0.6% 1.1% 0.7% 0.99 4.7% 5.4% 5.7% 5.4% 0.99 7.4% 10.0% 11.1% 9.2%
This table reports simulated rejection frequency of the null hypothesis using t-Tests with bootstrapped
standard errors (presented in section A.4.2 with 10,000 resampling draws) for ORIV correlations. The
results report on 1,000 simulations with normally distributed variables for a range of sample sizes (n), true
correlations (ρ), and variability of measurement error (σ2η). Critical values are based on nominal test sizes
of 1% (Panel A), 5% (Panel B), and 10% (Panel C).
Overall, these results affirm the obvious caution when performing inference in relatively
small samples in which most of the variability in observations is due to measurement error.
More extreme cases may require additional data or a more refined test statistic accounting
for boundary issues that complicate the sampling distribution of the estimator as ρ∗XY → 1
(a complex statistical problem beyond the scope of the current paper).
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A.5 Equivalent Estimators
The ORIV estimator provides a convenient and intuitive representation for consolidating all
the information available to the experimenter. This convenient representation can be mo-
tivated by many representations and so we highlight here a couple of special cases yielding
numerically equivalent estimators to ORIV. These equivalences also motivate an interpre-
tation of ORIV as a model combination estimator that will be useful in characterizing the
estimator’s efficiency.
A.5.1 Averaging Left-Side Variables: KY ≥ 2
As mentioned in the text, averaging of observations is common in experimental work. As it
turns out, when measurement error occurs on both left- and right-side variables, a numeri-
cally equivalent estimator to ORIV can be derived by averaging observations of the left-side
variable and stacking only right-side variables.
Proposition 4. Suppose KY ≥ 2, let Y¯ = 1KY
∑KY
k=1 Y
k, and define:
Y¯OR = 1KX ⊗ Y¯
X¯OR =
[
X1′, . . . , XKX ′
]′ W¯OR =

W 1 0 · · · 0
0 W 2
. . . 0
0 · · · . . . ...
0 · · · 0 WKX

.
Then β¯OR =
(
X¯ ′ORPW¯ORX¯OR
)−1
X¯ ′ORPW¯OR Y¯OR = βˆ
∗.
Proof. The first step in the proof shows that X ′ORPWORXOR = KY X¯
′
ORPW¯ORX¯OR, which
comes immediately from the SUR structure ORIV imposes on the first stage regressions of
Xk on W k. Due to the blocked structure of W¯OR,
X¯ ′ORPW¯ORX¯OR =
KX∑
k=1
Xk′PWkX
k.
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Due to the stacked structure of X˜k and W˜ k, X˜k′PW˜kX˜
k = KYX
k′PWkXk, which when
blocked across the measurements of X∗, gives:
X ′ORPWORXOR =
KX∑
k=1
X˜k′PW˜kX˜
k =
KX∑
k=1
KYX
k′PWkX
k = KY X¯
′
ORPW¯ORX¯OR.
We complete the proof using a parallel argument to show X ′ORPWORYOR = KY X¯
′
ORPW¯OR Y¯OR.
A.5.2 Averaging Estimates of Individual IV Models: KY = 1
In the special case where KY = 1, either because there is only one measurement for Y
∗ or
because multiple measurements have been concentrated into Y¯ , the ORIV estimator is nu-
merically equivalent to a weighted average of estimates from the individual IV specifications.
Proposition 5. Let βˆk =
(
Xk′PWkXk
)−1
Xk′PWkY and ωk =
(
Xk′PWkXk
)
, then:
β˜∗ =
1∑KX
k=1 ωk
KX∑
k=1
ωkβˆk = βˆ
∗.
Proof. We begin with the observation that W˜ k = W k and X˜k = Xk when KY = 1. From
the previous subsection, we can write:
βˆ∗ =
(
KX∑
k=1
Xk′PWkX
k
)−1 KX∑
k=1
Xk′PWkY =
(
KX∑
k=1
ωk
)−1 KX∑
k=1
Xk′PWkX
kβˆk =
∑KX
k=1 ωkβˆk∑KX
k=1 ωk
= β˜∗.
A further specialized case of Proposition 5 applies when KX = 2. In this setting,
ω1 = X
1′PW 1X
1 = X1′PX2X
1 = X2′PX1X
2 = X2′PW 2X
2 = ω2.
Consequently, in the setting where KY = 1 and KX = 2, the ORIV estimator can be
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computed by taking the simple average of the two IV estimators βˆ1 and βˆ2.
A.6 GMM Representation, Efficiency, and GLS Estimation
We close our discussion of the ORIV estimator with a brief comment on the estimator’s
efficiency. First, we present an unweighted GMM representation for the ORIV estimator
to establish ORIV’s efficiency in a homoskedastic model where measurement error has a
constant variance across replicates. In the special case where measurement errors are ho-
moskedastic, the ORIV estimator is asymptotically efficient. In general, when measurement
errors are characterized by heteroskedastic variances, the efficiently weighted GMM estimator
corresponds to a GLS implementation of ORIV that can improve efficiency.
A.6.1 GMM Representation of the ORIV Estimator
ORIV’s efficiency derives from combining all available exclusion restrictions when estimating
the regression model. Let W jt denote the t
th row of the matrix Wt, construct the KYKX
identifying moment conditions:
gk,jt ≡ E
[(
Y kt −Xjt β
)
W jt
]
= 0, k = 1, . . . , KY , j = 1, . . . , KX .
2
We can consolidate these conditions using a vector representation:
gt ≡
[
g1,1t , . . . , g
1,KX
t , g
2,1
t , . . . , g
2,KX
t , . . . g
KY ,1
t , . . . , g
KY ,KX
t
]′
.
2This mean independence assumption is implied by the conditional independence assumptions in Assump-
tions 1 and 2. However, the conditional independence assumptions provide additional restrictions on higher
order moments such that E[(Y kt − Xjt β)f(W jt )] = 0 for any function f . Under conditional independence,
these additional restrictions are informative and could be used to enhance estimator efficiency or test the
validity of the independence assumptions.
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The GMM objective function weights the quadratic loss for the sample-estimated moment
conditions g¯n ≡ 1n
∑n
t=1 gt so that:
βˆGMM = argmin g¯
′
nW g¯n
where W is a KYKX ×KYKX weighting matrix.
In our leading specification, which features homoskedastic errors and homogeneous vari-
ances across replicated measures, the efficient choice for W is the identity matrix (since all
moment restrictions are equally informative). The GMM objective function in this case ex-
actly matches the objective function minimized by the ORIV estimator, establishing ORIV’s
efficiency as demonstrated in Section A.6.2. More generally, in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity or heterogeneous contamination variances, the identity-weighting matrix may be inef-
ficient. In these cases, discussed in Sections A.6.3 and A.6.4, the efficiently-weighted GMM
estimator is equivalent to an FGLS implementation of ORIV that also achieves efficiency.
A.6.2 Efficiency in Homoskedastic Setting: KY = 1
In this subsection, we consider efficiency when KY = 1 while maintaining the following
homogeneity assumption for variances in the model.
Assumption 3 (Identical Variances Across Replicates). Suppose measurement error has the
same variance for all replicates, so that:
1. σν,X,k = σν,X,j = σν,X , ∀j, k 2. σν,Y,k = σν,Y,j = σν,Y , ∀j, k.
Intuitively, efficiency obtains under Assumption 3 because each observation is equally
informative and, as such, should be weighted equally. To verify efficiency, we analyze the
variance-covariance matrix for estimates from individual models. Let Bˆ =
[
βˆ1, . . . , βˆKX
]′
.
The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for this vector is defined by the limit of the scaled
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covariances:
NCov
[
βˆi, βˆj
]
= N
X i′PW iPW jXj
(X i′PW iX i) (Xj′PW˜ jXj))
s1(1{i=j})
=
1
N
X i′PW iPW jXj(
1
N
X i′PW iX i
) (
1
N
Xj′PW˜ jXj)
)s1(1{i=j}) →p ζi,j.
We will show below that the homoskedastic measurement error guaranteed by Assumption
3 implies ζi,j = ζk,l,∀i 6= j, k 6= l, and ζi,i = ζj,j, ∀i, j, allowing us to express the asymptotic
variance-covariance matrix for Bˆ as:
Σ∞
Bˆ
= 1KX1
′
KX
ζ1,2 + IKXζ1,1.
If we want to form an efficient linear combination of the estimators in Bˆ while maintaining
consistency, we would be looking for a vector of weights, w = [w1, w2, . . . , wKX ]
′, that sum
to one and minimize:
w∗ = arg min
w
w′Σ∞
Bˆ
w, such that, w′1KX = 1
⇒ w∗ = K−1X 1KX .
That is, in the homoskedastic setting, equally weighting the estimates of the individually
valid IV estimators is asymptotically efficient.
Proposition 6 (Two-Parameter Covariance Matrix for Individual IV Estimators). Under
Assumptions (1)–(3), the variance-covariance matrix for estimates from the individual IV
models for β∗ features constant correlations and homoskedastic variances. That is,
Σ∞
Bˆ
= 1KX1
′
KX
ζ1,2 + IKXζ1,1.
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Proof. By virtue of the homoskedastic measurement error, in the limit:
plim
N→∞
1
N
X i′PW iX
i = plim
N→∞
1
N
Xj′PW jX
j ≡ ω11, and
plim
N→∞
1
N
X i′PW iPW jX
j = plim
N→∞
1
N
Xk′PWkPW lX
l ≡ ω12, and,, ∀i 6= j, k 6= l
The exact formulas for the constants ω involve some algebraic manipulation. The rel-
atively simple constant for the norm of X i projected onto its instruments W i is just the
expected R2 of the first stage regression:
ω11 =
(KX − 1)E[(X∗)2]2
(KX − 1)E[(X∗)2] + σ2νX
.
With respect to ω12, notice that
plim
N→∞
1
N
X i′W i = E
[
X inW
i′
n
]
= E
[
(X∗)2
]
1′KX−1
plim
N→∞
1
N
W i′W i = E
[
W inW
i′
n
]
= E
[
(X∗)2
]
1KX−11
′
KX−1 + σ
2
νX
IKX−1
plim
N→∞
1
N
W i′W j = E
[
W inW
j′
n
]
= E
[
(X∗)2
]
1KX−11
′
KX−1 + σ
2
νX
E ′iEj
Here Ei is a KX×(KX−1) matrix constructed by removing the ith column from the KX×KX
identity matrix. Establishing the probability limit result for plim
N→∞
1
N
X i′PW iPW jX
j requires
chaining together and inverting a series of these expressions:
plim
N→∞
1
N
X i′PW iPW jX
j = plim
N→∞
1
N
X i′W i
(
1
N
W i′W i
)−1
1
N
W i′W j
(
1
N
W j′W j
)−1
1
N
W j′Xj
Importantly, the dependence on which measurements are involved, i and j is entirely wrapped
up in inner products of the form 1′KX−1E
′
iEj1KX−1 = KX − 2
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A.6.3 Efficiency in Heteroskedastic Settings: KY = 1
We now consider efficiency in the heteroskedastic setting, relaxing assumption 3 to allow
for the case where σνkX 6= σνjX , while maintaining the assumption that KY = 1. In this
setting, the heteroskedastic errors will admit a more efficient GLS estimator. Here, SX is
the diagonal matrix with σ2
νkX
in the (k, k)th entry, so that:
ΣKY =1εOR =
(
σ2ε∗ + σ
2
νY
) [(
1KX1
′
KX
)⊗ IN]+ β∗2 (SX ⊗ IN)
Importantly, even though the off-diagonal terms retain a homoskedastic structure, now the
diagonal terms reflect the heteroskedasticity in the measurement error for X. It is this
heteroskedasticity that allows for enhanced efficiency. For efficient estimation in the presence
of heteroskedasticity, the usual formulas for GLS estimation can be used for ORIV.
To characterize the efficient weights associated with each of the individual IV models, we
can again consider the model combination exercise pertaining to the combination of estimates
in Bˆ to minimize variance. ΣBˆ is no longer going to have constant variances and covariances.
Without a homogeneity assumption, we cannot further simplify its representation beyond
the results above:
w∗ = arg min
w
w′Σ∞
Bˆ
w, such that, w′1KX = 1
⇒ w∗ = Σ
∞−1
Bˆ
1KX
1′KXΣ
∞−1
Bˆ
1KX
.
Without reweighting observations, the ORIV estimator will assign weights of wi,OR =
Xi′PWiXi∑K
k=1(Xk′PWkXk)
. Therefore, consider reweighting observations for the ith model to achieve
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the optimal weights. Specifically, defining λi ≡
√
w∗i
wi,OR
and λ ≡ [λ1, . . . , λKX ]′, let
Y˜OR,λ = λ⊗ Y 1
X˜OR,λ =
[
λ1X
1′, . . . , λKXX
KX ′]′ W˜OR,λ =

λ1W
1 0 · · · 0
0 λ2W
2 . . . 0
0 · · · . . . ...
0 · · · 0 λKXWKX

.
Then βˆ∗GLS =
(
X˜ ′OR,λPW˜OR,λX˜OR,λ
)−1
X˜ ′OR,λPW˜OR,λY˜OR,λ is the efficient, asymptotically un-
biased estimator for β∗.
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A.6.4 Efficiency in Heteroskedastic Settings: KY ≥ 2
The efficiency arguments in the homoskedastic setting when KY = 1 extend immediately to
models with KY > 1 by the equivalence result in Proposition 4. The heteroskedastic setting
is slightly complicated because the simple average is no longer the most efficient way to
combine the information in the different measurements of Y . Instead, we replace the simple
average with the efficient average, Y¯GLS =
1∑KY
k=1 σ
−2
νk
Y
∑KY
k=1 σ
−2
νkY
Y k.
Having minimized measurement error in the left-side variable, Y ∗, we can construct the
weighted GLS estimator from the previous subsection. Define ˜¯YOR,λ = λ ⊗ Y¯GLS. Then
ˆˆ
β∗GLS =
(
X˜ ′OR,λPW˜OR,λX˜OR,λ
)−1
X˜ ′OR,λPW˜OR,λ
˜¯YOR,λ is the efficient, asymptotically unbiased
estimator for β∗.
A.6.5 Estimating Measurement Error Variance and FGLS Efficiency: KY = 1
Feasibly implementing the GLS adjustments proposed in the previous two subsections re-
quires estimating the weighting parameters λ. Clearly, the weights for wi,OR can be readily
estimated from sample data. As such, we focus on estimating w∗, an exercise that turns to
estimating Σ∞B . In the heteroskedastic setting,
Cov
[
βˆi, βˆj
]
=

Xi′PWiPWjX
j
(Xi′PWiXi)(Xj′PW˜jXj))
s10, if i 6= j
1
Xi′PWiX
i s1i, if i = j
.
Feasible implementation then requires estimating s10 and s1i. Recalling their definition
from (A.2), a feasible estimator for s10 would average over the cross-products between resid-
uals corresponding to two different elicitations of X∗ for the same individual. The feasible
estimator for s1i then just sums those squared residuals corresponding to the i
th model’s
specification.
sˆ10 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
2
(KX − 1) (KX − 2)
KX−1∑
i=1
KX∑
j=i+1
εˆinεˆ
j
n , and, sˆ1i =
1
N
N∑
n=1
εˆi2n .
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Applications of the Law of Large Numbers then ensure that sˆ1i →p s1i, i = 0, . . . , KX .
Substituting these values into the formula for Σ∞B defines a consistent estimator ΣˆB →p Σ∞B ,
which can be used to consistently estimate the efficient weights, wˆ∗ =
Σˆ−1B 1KX
1′KX Σˆ
−1
B 1KX
.
A.6.6 Estimating Measurement Error Variance and FGLS Efficiency: KY ≥ 2
Implementing feasible efficient estimators with multiple measurements of Y ∗, each of which
has different variances, requires estimating the variance-covariance matrix for the different
measurements. This setting is straightforward, as the objective of inference can be directly
estimated. Let ΣˆY → ΣY denote the sample and population covariance matrix for the
different measurements of Y . Recalling that SY is the diagonal matrix of measurement error
variances for Y ∗, it is immediately apparent that:
ΣY = σ
2
ε∗1KY 1
′
KY
+ SY .
Consequently, a consistent estimate of σ2
νkY
could estimate σ2ε∗ by averaging the off-diagonal
entries of ΣY , and subtracting this average from the k
th diagonal entry.
A.6.7 A Note of Caution on FGLS Implementations
When implementing FGLS for ORIV, it is best to exploit the structure of the model to its
fullest extent. Simply applying FGLS to the full ORIV specification will perform very poorly.
Since the population covariance matrix for residuals is singular, in finite samples, its inverse
is not well scaled. Even attempting to simply combine elicitations for Y efficiently can result
in extreme weights without imposing homogeneity on the off-diagonal entries in ΣY . While
we do not present detailed results to this effect, our simulation analysis suggests that FGLS
estimators perform poorly relative to the simple ORIV estimator. Unless there is good reason
to model substantial heterogeneity in measurement error, our informal recommendation is
to avoid FGLS corrections.
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B Other Ways of Using Controls
B.1 Principal Components
The sixth column of Table 3 contains 76 control variables (including the non-parametric
controls for perceived rank and performance). With a dataset the size of ours, this does not
present a challenge, as can be seen from the fact that standard errors of the coefficient on
gender are stable across specifications. However, this many controls would be infeasible in a
sample on the order of the original NV experiment. Moreover, a potential concern with the
final column of Table 3 is that adding too many controls measured with error may bias the
coefficient on gender downwards. Although this is unlikely to be the case here due to the
size of our dataset and the fact that we get similar results with only five controls, it may be
a concern in smaller datasets. This raises the question of how to use a relatively exhaustive
control strategy with available degrees of freedom.
A growing literature in statistics and econometrics considers inference in the presence of a
high-dimensional set of sparse controls.3 One way to cope with this issue is to perform model
selection after rotating the controls into their principal components, following the strategy
proposed by Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2013). This transformation concentrates
the information from the controls into relatively few factors, effectively controlling for a rich
characterization of risk preferences and overconfidence without giving up too many degrees
of freedom.
Table B.1 illustrates this approach. We first conduct a principal components analysis of
all 76 controls used in the last column of Table 3. We then enter these principal components
sequentially in the columns of Table B.1. As can be seen, the first principal component
causes the coefficient on gender to fall by approximately half, the third by a further half,
3This literature’s roots lie in machine learning techniques for automating model selection, including the
LASSO (Tibshirani, 1996), SCAD (Fan and Li, 2001), and the Dantzig Selector (Candes and Tao, 2007).
Performing inference after model selection presents a non-trivial statistical problem (Leeb and Po¨tscher,
2005) with recent innovations from Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Wang (2011), Fan and Liao (2014), Belloni,
Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2013), and Van de Geer et al. (2014) establishing new techniques for robust
inference after model selection.
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Table B.1: Principal components can be used to save degrees of freedom.
Dependent Variable: Chose to Compete (N = 783)
Male 0.19∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.054∗ 0.041
(.034) (.034) (.034) (.033) (.033) (.033)
First Principal 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
Component (.017) (.017) (.016) (.016) (.016)
Second Principal 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019
Component (.016) (.015) (.015) (.015)
Third Principal -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
Component (.015) (.015) (.015)
Fourth Principal -0.0094 -0.0093
Component (.015) (.015)
Fifth Principal 0.034∗∗
Component (.015)
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.20
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, with
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors on all non-dichotomous
measures are standardized. N = 783.
and the fifth by an additional 25%. The second and fourth have no impact on the coefficient
on gender. The adjusted-R2 begins to drop when the 12th component is entered, at which
point the coefficient on male is 0.0431 (s.e. 0.0330)—that is, the coefficient on male does not
change meaningfully as components 6 through 11 are added. Importantly, this suggests one
can control for all relevant variation using only five controls. Moreover, this strategy allows
the use of non-parametric or semi-parametric versions of the controls we enter linearly.
As can be seen throughout the table, the second and fourth principal components are
statistically insignificant, indicating the potential for using LASSO, or similar variable selec-
tion techniques, when using principal components. The Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen
(2013) approach would imply a two-stage model selection strategy, using first a LASSO re-
gression to select the principal components of the controls that correlate with tournament
participation and then using a second LASSO regression to select the components that cor-
relate with gender. We refer interested readers to their paper for details of the algorithm.
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B.2 Measurement Error in Binary Choices
As mentioned in the text, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) attempt to control for preferences
with another competition choice. Namely, in the last stage of the experiment (their Task 4),
participants are given a second opportunity to be paid for their performance in the piece-
rate task (Task 1). They may choose whether to be paid as a piece rate, or to enter their
Task 1 performance into a tournament with the other three participants in the group (this
decision affected participants’ payoffs when Task 4 was randomly chosen for payment by the
experimenters). This choice has the same payoff features as the competitive choice given
in their main task (Task 3). The idea is that the choice in Task 4 would control for risk
aversion, overconfidence, and feedback aversion, so that different choices in Task 3 and Task
4 would be explained by a difference in preferences for competition per se. However, in the
presence of measurement error, this control is subject to the issues highlighted in Section 3.
Here, we explore the effect of measurement error in binary controls theoretically. We then
show that an analysis of NV’s data that properly accounts for measurement error leads to
the same conclusion we arrive at, that gender differences in competition are driven by gender
differences in fundamental attitudes such as risk aversion and overconfidence.
Although this section is motivated by the approach in NV, it is developed in generality
as it applies to any case where a binary elicitation, measured with error, is used as a control.
The next subsection carries out this general analysis, and the following subsection gives a
numerical example that is closely related to NV.
B.2.1 Stochastic Choice with Binary Preference Control
This section provides the formal arguments underlying Section 3.3. In the general formula-
tion, let individual i have latent characteristics Xi (risk and overconfidence), and be identified
by treatment Di (gender). Each such individual faces two binary decision tasks in which
they report Y ai ∈ {0, 1} (competition) as well as its replicate Y bi ∈ {0, 1} (entering piece-rate
performance into a competition). Each individual answers 1 to both the decision task and
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the replicate with probability pi(Xi) that depends on Xi but is independent of treatment,
Di, so that
E[Y ai |Xi, Di] = E[Y ai |Xi] = pi(Xi) = E
[
Y bi |Xi
]
= E
[
Y bi |Xi, Di
]
.
Though Y ai |Xi ⊥ Di ⊥ Y bi |Xi, the unconditional statement is not generally true due to
potential dependence between Di and Xi. Consequently, pi is correlated with Di only because
both are correlated with Xi.
By a standard application of the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem, we can estimate the
effect of D on Y a conditional on a set of controls in two stages. That is, we can get rid of
the dependence on Xi, through pi(Xi), to directly understand how measurement error would
produce a biased estimate of the effect of D on Y a, even controlling for Y b. In the first stage,
we regress Y a and D on the controls and recover the residuals from both regressions:
Y a = piY a,0 + piY a,1pi(Xi) + uY a
D = piD,0 + piD,1pi(Xi) + uD.
In the second stage, we regress the residual variation in outcomes, uY a , on the residual
variation in treatment, uD.
uY a = βuD + ε.
Without measurement error, the estimate of β would be zero.
However, when Y bi as a proxy for pi(Xi) this introduces measurement error. In this case,
the first-stage estimates for piY a,· and piD,· will be biased towards zero by measurement error.
Consequently, in the second stage regression of uY a on uD, both residuals will be tainted by
persistent variation in the controls due to measurement error. Further, the contamination
in both residuals will be correlated. This correlated contamination is what drives distorted
inference in the second stage regression.
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Replacing each individual’s choice probability pi with the replicate Y
b
i provides just this
form of measurement error. To show this formally, denote this error as νi = Y
b
i − pi, which
takes the value −pi with probability 1 − pi and the value 1 − pi with the complementary
probability pi. Then we have
Y a = p˜iY a,0 + p˜iY a,1Y
b + u˜Y a = p˜iY a,0 + p˜iY a,1(p+ ν) + u˜Y a
D = p˜iD,0 + p˜iD,1Y
b + u˜D = p˜iD,0 + p˜iD,1(p+ ν) + u˜D.
The residuals for this regression clearly differ from those in the regression without measure-
ment error. Let γY a =
Var[Y a]
Var[Y a]+Var[ν]
and γD =
Var[D]
Var[D]+Var[ν]
, so that p˜i·,1 = γ·pi·,1. Note that
pi1,· − p˜i1,· = (1− γ·)pi1,· and
pi0,· = E[Y a]− pi1,·E[p]
p˜i0,· = E[Y a]− p˜i1,·E
[
Y b
] ⇒ p˜i0,· = pi0,· + (pi1,· − p˜i1,·)E[p]
= pi0,· + (1− γ·)pi1,·E[p] .
We can now relate the residuals u˜· to their uncontaminated counterpart u·:
u· − u˜· = p˜i0,· − pi0,· + (p˜i1,· − pi1,·)p+ p˜i1,·ν
= (1− γ·)pi1,·{E[p] + p}+ γ·pi1,·ν.
Regressing the contaminated residual in outcomes on the contaminated residual in treat-
ment then yields a spurious correlation, as
Cov[u˜Y a , u˜D] = Cov[uY a + (1− γY a)pi1,Y ap+ γY api1,Y aν, uD + (1− γD)pi1,Dp+ γDpi1,Dν]
= Cov[uY a , uD] + (1− γY a)pi1,Y a(1− γD)pi1,DVar[p] + γY api1,Y aγDpi1,DVar[ν],
where constant expectations are dropped for compactness. We also see that:
Var[u˜D] = Var[uD] + (1− γD)2pi21,DVar[p] + γ2Dpi21,DVar[ν].
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Consequently, even though Cov[uY a , uD] = 0, when we test the second stage regression:
u˜Y a = β˜u˜D,
we are likely to get biased results indicating a significant treatment effect in the contaminated
data because:
E
[
β˜
]
=
(1− γaY )pi1,Y a(1− γD)pi1,DVar[p] + γY api1,Y aγDpi1,DVar[ν]
Var[uD] + (1− γD)2pi21,DVar[p] + γ2Dpi21,DVar[ν]
6= 0.
B.2.2 Numerical Example
Note that choosing to compete in NV is tantamount to choosing a lottery that pays a
fixed amount with some probability—the probability of winning the tournament—and zero
otherwise, over a sure thing—the piece-rate payment.4 We use this observation to present a
numerical example.
In the setup of the competition task, the choice will be driven by the interaction of sub-
jective probabilities of winning (overconfidence) with risk aversion. To simplify, we consider
only variations in risk aversion for a fixed lottery and certainty equivalent. Participants are
given the choice between a lottery that pays $100 with a 25% probability and receiving a
$20 payment with certainty. Each participant has CRRA utility with risk aversion param-
eter θi. Conditional on risk aversion, participants’ choices are governed by logistic choice
probabilities:
pi = Pr{Choose Lottery|θi} =
exp{ 0.25
1−θi100
1−θi}
exp{ 0.25
1−θi100
1−θi}+ exp{ 1
1−θi20
1−θi}
To synthetically calibrate preferences, participants who have θi =
log(4/5)
log(1/5)
≈ 0.14 are indiffer-
ent between the lottery and the certainty equivalent, choosing each with equal probability.
We assume the risk-aversion parameter is distributed normally for men and women, with
4Indeed, participants were informed of the number of correct sums they solved during each task.
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Figure B.1: Example Illustrating Lottery Choice Probabilities and Gender-Differences in
Risk Aversion
Risk Aversion: θ
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Pr
(Y
 = 
1)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p(θ
 
| G
en
de
r)
0
2
4
6
8
10
Mens' Density for θ
Womens' Density for θ
Logit Choice Probabilities
each distribution having standard deviation 0.05. To calibrate choices to the 19.0% gap in
competition we observe in our data, we assume the distribution for men has mean 0.15, and
for women, 0.2. This results in men and women who will choose the lottery about 46% and
27% of the time, respectively. Figure B.1 illustrates the probability of choosing the lottery
conditional on risk aversion and the distributions over risk aversion for men and women.
Let Y ai = 1{Player i Chooses Lottery in Main Decision} represent the observed choice for
participant i in the main decision task. If we knew θi and could compute each individual’s pi,
then pi ≡ E[Y ai |θi] would be the best predictor for Y ai and the ideal explanatory variable and
control. As such, following NV, we describe pi as an individual’s preferences. A regression
of Y ai on gender and preferences pi would fail to find any relationship between gender and
lottery take-up (competition) in a large sample.
If we only observe a replicate Y bi = 1{Player i Chooses Lottery in Replicate Task}, that
replicate will have classical, mean-zero measurement error for the proper control pi. Letting
ηi = Y
b
i − pi, the variance of the realization of this measurement error, pi(1− pi) correlates
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with gender because the distribution of pi depends on gender.
Numerically, if we simulate the choices Y ai , Y
b
i for 800 individuals (calibrated to our
sample size) and regress the choice of the lottery in Y ai on gender 10,000 times, we observe
an average coefficient of 0.16 (or 16%, s.e. 0.034, p < 0.01). This can be understood to
occur because although the coefficient on Y b should be unity, it is instead 0.19 (s.e. 0.036,
p < 0.01) due to measurement error.
This suggests that by forcing the coefficient on Y bi to be 1, the resulting regression can
produce a valid test. That is, by regressing Y ai − Y bi on gender, the resulting coefficient will
be a conservative test of the effect of gender controlling for the second choice.5 Following this
prescription in our simulated data gives a very accurate and precise estimate of −0.000078
(s.e. 0.034, p = 1.00).
C Example STATA
C.1 Using Principal Components as Controls
tab sumsRank, gen(ss)
tab sumsCorrectCompete, gen(scc)
tab performanceDiff, gen(pdd)
#delimit;
pca ss* scc* pdd* *RiskyProjectAllocation riskyUrn*0MaxValue compoundUrn*
*Over* CRTCorrect CRTPercentile ravenCorrect ravenPercentile guess*Confidence
gpaPercentile;
#delimit cr
predict p1-p76
//stardardize principal components to make output easily interpretable
foreach x of varlist p1-p5 {
sum ‘x’
5The test is conservative because although the left side will now properly correspond to Y − E[Y |X],
the right side will consist of D rather than D − E[D|X]. This test is asymptotically efficient, but it will be
inefficient in small samples.
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replace ‘x’ = (‘x’-r(mean))/r(sd)
}
reg sumsCompete male p1-p5
C.2 ORIV When Y is Measured without Error
This subsection and the next implement ORIV assuming that the X and Y variables are
on the same scale. If they are not, one should first put them on the same scale. If there is
an obvious way to do this, as in the case of certainty equivalents of lotteries with the same
probabilities, but a different high option, this should be done. Otherwise standardization of
the variables may be attractive.
Note that if one estimates 2SLS in stages, the estimated standard errors from the second
stage, in (7), would be incorrect, as they do not take into account the fact that Xˆa and Xˆb
are estimated. Therefore, it is preferable to estimate (6) directly, using a statistical package’s
2SLS command as this will give correct asymptotic standard errors.
keep id highLowValue firstProjectValue secondProjectValue
//standardize variables
for each var of varlist highLowValue-secondProjectValue {
quietly sum ‘var’
replace ‘var’ = (‘var’ - r(mean))/r(sd)
}
expand 2, generate(replicant)
gen mainVar = firstProjectValue if replicant == 0
replace mainVar = secondProjectValue if replicant == 1
gen instrument = secondProjectValue if replicant == 0
replace instrument = firstProjectValue if replicant == 1
//One constant per stack
forvalues x=0/1 {
gen constant‘x’ = replicant == ‘x’
}
ivregress 2sls highLowValue (mainVar = instrument) control*, cluster(id) nocons
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C.3 ORIV Estimates of a Correlation
keep id riskyUrn20Value riskyUrn30Value compoundUrn20Value compoundUrn30Value
replace id = _n
//standardize variables
for each var of varlist riskyUrn20Value-compoundUrn30Value {
quietly sum ‘var’
replace ‘var’ = (‘var’ - r(mean))/r(sd)
}
//Duplicate data four times for each way of stacking data
expand 4
sort id
gen replicant = mod(_n,4)
//Created stacked variables
gen LHS = riskyUrn20Value if replicant <= 1
replace LHS = riskyUrn30Value if replicant >= 2
gen mainVar = compoundUrn20Value if replicant == 0 | replicant == 2
replace mainVar = compoundUrn30Value if replicant == 1 | replicant == 3
gen instrument = compoundUrn30Value if replicant == 0 | replicant == 3
replace instrument = compoundUrn20Value if replicant == 1 | replicant == 2
//One constant per stack
forvalues x=1/4 {
gen constant‘x’ = replicant == ‘x’-1
}
//Compute ORIV coefficients and correlations
ivregress 2sls LHS (mainVar = instrument) constant*, cluster(id) nocons
local correctedCoefficient = _b[mainVar]
qui corr riskyUrn20Value riskyUrn30Value if replicant == 0, cov
local correctedYVar = r(cov_12)
qui corr compoundUrn20Value compoundUrn30Value if replicant == 0, cov
local correctedXVar = r(cov_12)
local correctedCorrelation = ///
‘correctedCoefficient’*sqrt(‘correctedXVar’/‘correctedYVar’)
display "The ORIV Correlation is: ‘correctedCorrelation’"
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C.4 Bootstrapped Standard Errors
//note: should already have dataset generated above in memory
local reps = 10000
keep if replicant == 0
drop replicant
capture program drop orivbstrap
program define orivbstrap, rclass
preserve
bsample,cluster(id)
quietly ivreg LHS (mainVar = instrument) control*, nocons
scalar BSCorrectedCoefficient = _b[mainVar]
quietly corr riskyUrn20Value riskyUrn30Value, cov
scalar BSCorrectedYVar = r(cov_12)
quietly corr compoundUrn20Value compoundUrn30Value, cov
scalar BSCorrectedXVar = r(cov_12)
return scalar BSCorrectedCorrelation = ///
BSCorrectedCoefficient*sqrt(BSCorrectedXVar/BSCorrectedYVar)
restore
end
simulate BSCorrectedCorrelation = ///
r(BSCorrectedRho), reps(‘reps’) seed(10) nodots: orivbstrap
bstat, stat(correctedCorrelation)
D Comparison of Participant Pools
We now compare responses to standard choice tasks on the Caltech Cohort Study (CCS) to
other participant pools. The participant’s responses on the CCS resemble those previously
reported. That is, the participants in the CCS are not dramatically different from those in
other participant pools. This is in line with the replication results reported in the paper:
before correcting for measurement error, our data yield virtually identical conclusions to
those reported in the original experiments.
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D.1 The Beauty Contest
Each installment of the CCS contained a beauty contest game following Nagel (1995). Each
participant is asked to choose a number between 0 and 100. They are told that they will
be grouped with 9 randomly-chosen participants, and if their choice is closest to 2/3 of the
average of the choices in that group, they will receive a $5 reward, otherwise nothing.6
This task is often viewed as a proxy for cognitive sophistication. Any choice above 66.66
is dominated. If everyone uses undominated strategies, any choice above 44.44 will not pay
off. In this way, each iteration can be associated with a greater level of sophistication. In
the limit, this iterated elimination of dominated strategies yields the unique equilibrium of
the game—everyone should choose 0. Nagel (1995) reported numbers very far from 0 when
the game was played for the first time by Bonn University students. In her data, the mean
number chosen was 36.73 and the median was 33. Data from the first installment of the
CCS in the Fall of 2013 yields similar results: In our sample of 806 participants, the mean
was 37.17 with a median of 33.7
D.2 The Cognitive Reflection Test
Next we compare responses on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), described briefly in
Section 2.1. The CRT was introduced by Frederick (2005) and consists of three quantitative
questions, each having a seemingly intuitive answer that is wrong. In the Spring 2015
installment of the CCS, we included the three questions proposed by Frederick (2005), but
with different wording and scaling.
The number of correct answers on the CRT is viewed as a proxy for meta-cognition. It
is associated with time preferences: participants who score higher are more “patient”. In
the CCS, the fraction of participants with 0, 1, 2, and 3 correct answers are 19%, 25%, 28%,
and 27%, respectively. Frederick (2005) reports responses from 11 participant populations
6If they tie with a subset of k participants in their group, each gets 1/k of the $5 reward.
7While Nagel (1995) does not report her raw data, the distribution of selected numbers in our data
visually resembles the distribution depicted in her Figure 1B.
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with aggregate proportions of 33%, 28%, 23%, and 17%. In the CCS, participants were less
likely to answer no question correctly, and more likely to answer all three questions correctly,
while the rates for 1 or 2 correct answers are similar.
D.3 Dictator Giving
All installments of the CCS included the dictator game, in which participants have to divide
a fixed allocation between themselves and another randomly chosen participant. We have
noted that generosity declines markedly the second time a student participates in the CCS,
so we focus on the initial, Fall 2013, installment. The mean amount given away is 22%, with
43% giving away nothing, 13% giving away a third, and 27% giving away half.
Engel (2011) compiles data from 83 papers, consisting of 616 treatments and 20,813
individual observations. The mean amount given away across all treatments was 28%. At
the individual level, he reports that 36% give away nothing, 9% give away a third, and 17%
give away half. These numbers are very close to those we observe. Participants in the CCS
are slightly more extreme in the sense that they are more likely to give away nothing, but
when they do give, they are more generous.
D.4 Risky Projects
We conclude in Section 4 that a particularly appealing risk elicitation is the “Project” mea-
sure, described in Section 2.1, and based on Gneezy and Potters (1997). Here we focus on
a particular implementation of this elicitation in the Fall 2014 installment of the CCS. This
implementation allowed participants to allocate 200 tokens between a safe option and a risky
project, the latter returning 2.5 tokens with 50% probability per token allocated.8 In our
data, the mean allocation to the risky project is 74%, with a median of 75%.
In comparison, Agranov and Yariv (2015) elicit precisely the same measure in 8 sessions
8We focus on this version of the task since it is the most commonly used and therefore allows for a natural
comparison with existing data.
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with 80 students at the University of California, Irvine (UCI). There, the mean allocation
was 72% with a median of 70%. The distribution of allocations in their data looks very
similar to that in the CCS. For example, in the CCS approximately 30% of participants
allocated half or less of their endowment to the risky project, while at UCI approximately
35% of participants did.
E Question Wordings
Screenshots and design details of the CCS can be found in Section 2. Here we present the
question wordings that were used in this paper. Throughout this section, comments in square
brackets are meant to express information that is not found on the screen, but is useful in
understanding the flow of the survey. A new item number generally indicates another screen
(even though there may not be a particular question associated with it).
E.1 Competition
This question, meant to elicit competitiveness, follows NV, and was used on the Spring 2015
CCS. It consists of several parts, some of which are used by both LV and us as controls.
1. This next task asks you to add together series of numbers. You will be given three
minutes to complete as many sums as possible. When all surveys are submitted, we
will randomly group you with 3 other people (so you will be in a group of 4). You will
be paid only if you achieve the highest number of completed sums within
this group, in which case you will be paid 40 tokens per sum completed.
In case of a tie between those who completed the highest number of sums, we will
randomly determine the participant who will be paid.
2. [3 minutes in which to do as many sums as the participant can]
3. In the randomly determined group of 4 (you and 3 others), where do you think you rank
in terms of the number of sums completed (1 corresponding to the highest number of
sums completed in the group, 4 corresponding to the lowest number of sums completed
in the group). You will earn an additional 50 tokens if your guess is correct.
[radio buttons next to numbers 1 through 4]
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4. You will be given an additional three minutes to complete as many sums as possible.
Please pick how you would like to be paid from the following two options:
(a) 10 tokens per sum completed; or
(b) When all surveys are submitted, we will randomly group you with 3 other people
(so you will be in a group of 4). We will compare the number of sums you complete
now with the number of sums the other 3 completed in the previous stage you
just concluded. You will be paid only if you achieve the highest number
of completed sums within this group, in which case you will be paid 40
tokens per sum completed.
In case you tie with another participant(s), we will randomly determine whom of
these gets first place, and you will be paid only if it is you who is declared the
winner.
(c) [3 minutes in which to do as many sums as the participant can]
Some other details of our implementation are worth mentioning. As these are identical
to the design choices of NV, we address them here, rather than in the main text.
Generation of sums: The five two-digit numbers used for the tasks were generated ran-
domly.
Payment for guessed tournament rank: If there were ties in a group, Question 3 was
paid in the way that was most favorable to participants. For example, if a participant
correctly solved 14 sums, while others in the group solved 14, 12, and 11 sums, the
participant would get the 50 token reward with a guessed rank of either 1 or 2.
Selection of task: This task was chosen by NV because it was found to elicit similar per-
formance between men and women. This may not hold for all tasks: see Gneezy et al.
(2003).
Figure E.2 illustrates the performance of men and women in both tasks, splitting partici-
pants in the second task into those who chose to compete and those who chose the piece-rate
scheme. There is no significant difference between the performance of men and women in
the second task, regardless of the compensation scheme.
Online Appendix–39
Supplemental Material for: Leeat Yariv, Ben Gillen, Erik Snowberg. 2019. "Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with 
Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study." Journal of Political Economy 127(4). DOI: 10.1086/701681. 
Figure E.2: Performance in different tasks by gender
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However, in the first task there is a difference in performance. This difference occurs
among those that complete fewer than 10 sums. In that group, women solve slightly fewer
sums, on average, then men. This may appear to differ from the findings of NV, who observe
statistically identical performance. However, we have roughly 10 times as many participants
as they do. If we draw a group of 40 men and 40 women—the number of participants in
NV—10,000 times randomly from our data, we observe a p-value lower than 10% only 8.3%
of the time. Thus, performance data seems consistent with NV.
A final note on our implementation is warranted: because our experiment was conducted
on a survey rather than in the lab we could not enforce our prohibition on the use of
calculators. To mitigate this, sums were presented as images so they would be impossible to
cut and paste into an online calculator. Participants could not use the back button during
the task, and logging out and returning caused them to skip the task altogether. Participants
were asked to sign an acknowledgement that they would abide by the Caltech Honor Code.
Despite all this, we cannot eliminate the possibility that some students used calculators.
However, in order for this to affect our results, it would have to be the case that women
believed men used calculators more often, and that this belief affected not only their decision
to compete, but also their choices in unrelated risk aversion and overconfidence elicitations.
Moreover, as noted in the text, we later had 98 Caltech students take the survey in the
lab, where they could not use calculators. All results were substantially the same, but with
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larger standard errors driven by the smaller sample.
E.2 Overconfidence
These questions were used as controls in the regressions on competitiveness, and elicited on
the Spring 2015 CCS.
The first three questions are used as a control for overprecision, and are based on Ortoleva
and Snowberg (2015).
1. We will now measure your ability to assess numbers quickly.
We will show you three pictures of jars of jellybeans. Please give us your best guess as
to the number of jellybeans in each jar.
2. [With random picture of a jar of jellybeans] Please enter the number of jellybeans you
think are in this jar (between 1 and 1000).
3. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
(a) No confidence at all
(b) Not very confident
(c) Somewhat unconfident
(d) Somewhat confident
(e) Very confident
(f) Certain
[Repeat three times.]
The next set of questions ask the participant to complete a set of tasks, and then asks
the participant to guess their performance (as a measure of estimation / overestimation),
and then their guess as to how their performance compares with their peers (placement /
overplacement). Participants are given 30 seconds to answer each logical question.
4. This next task asks you to solve five logical puzzles. You will be given thirty seconds
to complete each puzzle, and will be paid 20 tokens for each puzzle solved correctly.
5. [5 Raven’s matrices from Condon and Revelle (2014). All participants executed the
same matrices in the same order.]
6. How many of the 5 puzzles do you think you solved correctly?
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7. Out of 100 other randomly picked survey participants, what percentage do you think
solved more puzzles correctly than you?
The next set follows the same structure, but uses questions from the cognitive reflection
test (CRT).
8. This next task asks you to answer five logical questions. You will have up to 30 second
to answer each question and will be paid 20 tokens for each question answered correctly.
9. A monitor and a keyboard cost $350 in total. The monitor costs $300 more than the
keyboard. How much does the keyboard cost?
10. It takes 10 computers 10 minutes to run 10 simulations. How long does it take 200
computers to run 200 simulations?
11. In the pond in front of Baxter Hall, there is a patch of lily pads. The patch doubles
in size every day. If it takes 36 days for the patch to cover the entire pond, how many
days would it take to cover half the pond?
12. Professor Wiseman spent one-fourth of his life as a boy, one-eighth as a youth, and
one-half as an active man. If Professor Wiseman spent 8 years as an old and wise man,
how many years did he spend as an active man?
13. A 4 foot pole casts a shadow that is 2 feet long on the ground. If the pole was 16 feet
in height, how long would the shadow be?
14. How many of the 5 questions do you think you answered correctly?
15. Out of 100 other randomly picked survey participants, what percentage do you think
answered more questions correctly than you?
E.3 Risk Elicitations
The Fall, 2014 CCS contained a large number of risk elicitations. The Spring, 2015 CCS
included variants of the risky projects, the risky urns, and the qualitative risk question,
which were used as controls for the competition task.
E.3.1 Projects
These risky projects are based on Gneezy and Potters (1997). Note that they were separated
by several questions on the survey.
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1. You are endowed with 200 tokens (or $2) that you can choose to keep or invest in a
risky project. Tokens that are not invested in the risky project are yours to keep.
The risky project has a 40% chance of success.
If the project is successful, you will receive 3 times the amount you chose to invest.
If the project is unsuccessful, you will lose the amount invested.
Please choose how many tokens you want to invest in the risky project. Note that you
can pick any number between 0 and 100, including 0 or 100:
2. You can invest in another risky project if you would like. You can invest up to 200
tokens, or you can choose to keep them.
The risky project has a 50% chance of success.
If the project is successful, you will receive 2.5 times the amount you chose to invest.
If the project is unsuccessful, you will lose the amount invested.
Please choose how many tokens you want to invest in the risky project. Note that you
can pick any number between 0 and 200, including 0 or 200:
E.3.2 Urn MPL
These are standard urn gambles, with certainty equivalents elicited using a multiple price
list. Note that the order of the lotteries was randomized, as was the order (spaced throughout
the survey) with the compound and ambiguous urn lotteries.
4. In the next task we will ask you to assess the value of several gambles. The gambles
will be designed using virtual urns filled with red and black balls. We will give you
some information on the composition of each urn.
Well let you pick which color ball you would like to pay off for each gamble. If you
choose a gamble on an urn, we will draw one ball from it. If that ball is the color you
chose, you will receive a reward. If it is the other color, you will receive nothing.
The mechanism for selecting the gamble may take some getting used to. We will
provide you with a list of rewards from 0 tokens to 150 tokens in increments of 5
tokens, and for each one, we ask that you think whether you prefer that amount, or
taking the urn gamble. Once you click on an option, well fill in the rest of the choices
for you so that they make sense (this will save you time!).
However, you should keep clicking on options that you prefer until the choice in each
line is what you would like. You should do so because at the end of the survey, we will
randomly select one row from the list, and you will get whatever you chose on that
line. If you specified you prefer a sure amount on that line, youll get that amount. If
you specified that you preferred the gamble, then we will draw a ball from the urn,
and pay you according to the description above.
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5. The next choice will involve an urn containing 20 balls, 10 of which are red and 10 of
which are black.
Which color ball would you like to paid 100 tokens for (if it is drawn from the urn in
the following questions)? Note that this means you will be paid 0 tokens if the other
color is drawn.
(a) red
(b) black
6. Urn with Equal Number of Red and Black Balls
The urn from which we can draw a ball is composed of 10 red balls and 10 black balls.
The urn gamble pays 100 tokens if the ball drawn is [red].
What do you prefer? (make sure a radio button in each row is selected)
[Multiple price list with “Urn Gamble” on the left side, and “X tokens” on the right
side, with X in increments of 10 from 0 to 100.]
7. The next choice will involve an urn containing 30 balls, 15 of which are red and 15 of
which are black.
Which color ball would you like to paid 150 tokens for (if it is drawn from the urn in
the following questions)? Note that this means you will be paid 0 tokens if the other
color is drawn.
(a) red
(b) black
8. Urn with Equal Number of Red and Black Balls
The urn from which we can draw a ball is composed of 15 red balls and 15 black balls.
The urn gamble pays 150 tokens if the ball drawn is [red].
What do you prefer? (make sure a radio button in each row is selected)
[Multiple price list with “Urn Gamble” on the left side, and “X tokens” on the right
side, with X in increments of 10 from 0 to 150.]
E.3.3 Lottery Menu
This question is based on Eckel and Grossman (2002).
9. Which of the following gambles would you prefer?
Each of the gambles will give you a 50% chance of the Low Payoff, and a 50% chance
of the High Payoff.
The gamble you chose will be run at the end of the survey, and we will tell you your
payoff then.
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Low Payoff High Payoff
Gamble 1: 140 140
Gamble 2: 120 180
Gamble 3: 100 220
Gamble 4: 80 260
Gamble 5: 60 300
Gamble 6: 10 350
E.3.4 Qualitative Risk Assessment
This qualitative assessment of risk comes from Dohmen et al. (2011). This was also elicited
on the Spring 2015 CCS, and that question was used to instrument the question on the Fall
2014 CCS.
10. How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: not at all willing to take risks
and the value 10 means: very willing to take risks
[radio buttons, presented horizontally, with numbers from 0 to 10 next to each option.]
E.4 Compound and Ambiguous Lotteries
Compound and ambiguous lotteries follow the same format as the risky urn lotteries above.
These three blocks of urn gambles were spaced out throughout the survey, and their order
was randomized. The compound lotteries were also used as a control (risk-aversion measure)
in the regressions regarding competitiveness.
1. The next choice will involve an urn containing 20 red and black balls. The composition
of the urn is randomly determined. That is, we will first randomly draw a number
between 0 and 20 (all equally likely). That number will be the number of red balls.
The remaining balls will be black.
Which color ball would you like to paid 100 tokens for (if it is drawn from the urn in
the following questions)? Note that this means you will be paid 0 tokens if the other
color is drawn.
(a) red
(b) black
Online Appendix–45
Supplemental Material for: Leeat Yariv, Ben Gillen, Erik Snowberg. 2019. "Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with 
Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study." Journal of Political Economy 127(4). DOI: 10.1086/701681. 
2. Urn with Uncertain Number of Red and Black Balls
The composition of the urn is randomly determined. That is, we will first randomly
determine a number between 0 and 20 (all equally likely). That number will be the
number of red balls, the rest of the 20 balls (if any) will be black.
The urn gamble pays 100 tokens if the ball drawn is [red].
What do you prefer? (make sure a radio button in each row is selected)
[Multiple price list with “Urn Gamble” on the left side, and “X tokens” on the right
side, with X in increments of 10 from 0 to 100.]
3. The next choice will involve an urn containing 30 red and black balls. The composition
of the urn is randomly determined. That is, we will first randomly draw a number
between 0 and 30 (all equally likely). That number will be the number of red balls.
The remaining balls will be black.
Which color ball would you like to paid 150 tokens for (if it is drawn from the urn in
the following questions)? Note that this means you will be paid 0 tokens if the other
color is drawn.
(a) red
(b) black
4. Urn with Uncertain Number of Red and Black Balls
The composition of the urn is randomly determined. That is, we will first randomly
determine a number between 0 and 30 (all equally likely). That number will be the
number of red balls, the rest of the 30 balls (if any) will be black.
The urn gamble pays 150 tokens if the ball drawn is [red].
What do you prefer? (make sure a radio button in each row is selected)
[Multiple price list with “Urn Gamble” on the left side, and “X tokens” on the right
side, with X in increments of 10 from 0 to 150.]
5. The next choice will involve an urn containing ,0 balls, each of which could be red or
black. Dean Dabiri has chosen the exact composition of the urn: the balls could all be
red, they could all be black, or there could be any combination of red and black balls.
Which color ball would you like to paid 100 tokens for (if it is drawn from the urn in
the following questions)? Note that this means you will be paid 0 tokens if the other
color is drawn.
(a) red
(b) black
6. Urn with Unknown Number of Red and Black Balls
The urn has a combination of 20 red and black balls chosen by Dean Dabiri.
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The urn gamble pays 100 tokens if the ball drawn is [red].
What do you prefer? (make sure a radio button in each row is selected)
[Multiple price list with “Urn Gamble” on the left side, and “X tokens” on the right
side, with X in increments of 10 from 0 to 100.]
7. The next choice will involve an urn containing 30 balls, each of which could be red or
black. Dean Dabiri has chosen the exact composition of the urn: the balls could all be
red, they could all be black, or there could be any combination of red and black balls.
Which color ball would you like to paid 150 tokens for (if it is drawn from the urn in
the following questions)? Note that this means you will be paid 0 tokens if the other
color is drawn.
(a) red
(b) black
8. Urn with Unknown Number of Red and Black Balls
The urn has a combination of 20 red and black balls chosen by Dean Dabiri.
The urn gamble pays 150 tokens if the ball drawn is [red].
What do you prefer? (make sure a radio button in each row is selected)
[Multiple price list with “Urn Gamble” on the left side, and “X tokens” on the right
side, with X in increments of 10 from 0 to 150.]
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